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Abstract  
Regional structural change is currently among the greatest challenges facing the 
public sector in many EU countries. In countries like Finland, where the public 
sectors have a large role in providing educational, health and social services, 
structural change rapidly becomes a fiscal problem. Demography is directly 
linked to the demand for public services and to the potential growth of regional 
economies. On the one hand, ageing increases the demand for age-related 
services; on the other, it decreases labour supply, limiting the growth potential of 
many regions. 
The state’s main tools for regional policies consist of both direct subsidies to the 
regions, as well as a mechanism reallocating tax revenues between poor and rich 
municipalities. However, the welfare costs of funding subsidies to poorer regions 
may be considerable. Thus, instruments not involving changes in spending have 
been preferred. Here, we consider the relocation of certain functions of the 
central government to the periphery – regionalization – as an instrument for 
coping with regional structural change. An improvement in regional municipal 
finances should also reduce the transfers received from the central government. 
This study aims at evaluating the effects of regionalization on regional 
development in recent years and in the near future. The study is related to an on-
going evaluation of the financial relations between the central government and 
local authorities. 
Regionalization has in practice meant the relocation of central government jobs. 
We can cover the relocation of jobs quite accurately, and also had a data to make 
a plausible valuation of the number of employees that actually relocated with the 
jobs. Moreover, we are able to calculate state transfers to municipalities at the 
level of individual municipalities within each region. However, to capture all the 
implications of relocation to regional economies, we extend the model to take 
into account the average size and age profile of the families of those who 
relocate. In this way, we obtain an estimate of the effects of regionalization on 
demand for public services locally, as well as on the overall effect on local 
population, labour supply and state, municipal and social security funds’ budget 
balances. 
We analyse regionalization at the level of the twenty regions of Finland, using a 
dynamic, regional, AGE model. Our main finding is that regionalization has 
negative overall economic effects for Finland – it decreases national product and 
employment, deteriorates the fiscal balance and increases state transfers to 
municipalities. However, these effects are small by magnitude. We found that the 
cumulative decrease in GDP until 2018 was a bit less than 0.05 percentages. The 
policy altogether succeeds in leveling regional disparities. We also find that 
while regionalization has been beneficial for many regions by creating new jobs 
and increasing municipal tax revenues, it has also used resources wastefully as 
there has been double efforts during the transition period. 
Key words: regionalization, regional policies, structural change 
JEL classification numbers: R13, R53 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Alueellinen rakennemuutos on yksi suurimmista julkisen sektorin kohtaamista 
haasteista monissa EU-maissa. Suomen kaltaisissa maissa, joissa julkisella 
sektorilla on keskeinen rooli koulutus-, terveys-, ja sosiaalipalveluiden 
järjestämisessä, rakennemuutoksesta tulee nopeasti fiskaalinen ongelma. 
Keskeisenä tekijänä julkisen kysynnän ja alueiden potentiaalisessa kasvussa on 
demografia. Ikääntyminen toisaalta lisää vanhuuteen liittyvien palveluiden 
kysyntää ja toisaalta vähentää työn tarjontaa, mikä rajoittaa useiden alueiden 
kasvupotentiaaleja. 
Valtion aluepoliittiset keinot koostuvat suorista tuista alueille sekä 
valtionosuuksien tasausjärjestelmästä, joka siirtää verotuloja rikkaammilta 
kunnilta köyhemmille. Suorien tukimaksujen hyvinvointikustannukset saattavat 
olla huomattavat. Tämän vuoksi on pyritty suosimaan keinoja, joilla ei ole 
vaikutuksia julkiseen kulutukseen. Olemme tutkineet yhtä keinoa alueellisen 
rakennemuutoksen tasaamiseksi eli alueellistamista, jossa siirretään tiettyjä 
julkisen sektorin toimintoja pääkaupunkiseudulta muille aluille. Köyhempien 
kuntien talouden kohenemisen tulisi myös vähentää valtionosuusjärjestelmän 
kautta tapahtuvaa varojen siirtoa. 
Tämä tutkimus pyrkii arvioimaan alueellistamisen taloudelliset vaikutukset viime 
vuosina ja lähitulevaisuudessa. Se liittyy meneillään olevaan valtion hallinnon ja 
aluehallinnon välisten rahoitussuhteiden evaluointiin. 
Käytännössä alueellistaminen on tarkoittanut keskushallinnon työpaikkojen 
uudelleen sijoittamista. Pystyimme kartoittamaan siirtyneet työpaikat melko 
tarkasti, ja pystyimme myös arvioimaan kuinka moni työntekijä todellisuudessa 
muutti työpaikan mukana. Lisäksi pystyimme laskemaan julkisen vallan siirrot 
paikallishallinnoille kuntatasolla. Jotta pystyimme arvioimaan kaikki vaikutukset 
aluetalouksille, laajensimme tarkastelua ottamaan huomioon mukana muuttavien 
perheiden keskimääräisen koon ja ikärakenteen. Tällä tavalla pystyimme 
arvioimaan alueellistamisen vaikutukset julkisten palveluiden kysynnän 
muutoksille aluetasolla sekä vaikutukset alueiden väestökehitykseen, työn 
tarjontaan sekä julkisten sektoreiden budjettien tasapainoon. 
Analysoimme alueellistamista Suomessa kahdenkymmenen maakunnan tasolla 
käyttämällä dynaamista ja alueellista yleisen tasapainon mallia VERM:iä. 
Johtopäätöksenä voimme todeta, että alueellistamisen taloudelliset vaikutukset 
ovat Suomelle negatiiviset – kansantuote ja työllisyys laskevat, julkisen sektorin 
alijäämä kasvaa ja valtion maksut kunnille kasvavat. Vaikutukset ovat kuitenkin 
määrällisesti pieniä. Arvioimme BKT:n kumulatiiviseksi laskuksi vuoteen 2018 
mennessä vajaa 0.05 %. Alueellisten erojen tasoittamisessa politiikalla on 
kuitenkin suotuisia vaikutuksia. Havaitsimme myös, että vaikka alueellistaminen 
on hyödyttänyt joitain alueita, se on myös sisältänyt resurssien tehotonta käyttöä 
erityisesti siirtymäkauden aikana. 
Asiasanat: alueellistaminen, aluepolitiikka, rakennemuutos 
JEL-luokittelu: R13, R53  
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1. Introduction 
Regional structural change is currently among the greatest challenges facing the 
public sector in many EU countries. Often, structural change is driven not only 
by economic factors, but also by demography. In countries like Finland, where 
the public sectors have a large role in providing educational, health and social 
services, structural change rapidly becomes a fiscal problem. Demography is 
directly linked to the demand for public services and to the potential growth of 
regional economies. On the one hand, ageing increases the demand for age-
related services; on the other, it decreases labour supply, limiting the growth 
potential of many regions. Many regions are also heavily affected by changes 
within a specific industry. 
The fiscal arsenal for coping with the implications structural change is limited. In 
Finland, the public sector consists of three main subsectors: the central (state) 
government, municipalities and the social security funds. Both the central 
government and municipalities collect income taxes and have various other tax-
like instruments, whereas the social security funds’ revenue consists mainly of 
employers’ and employees’ payments. The state’s main tools for regional 
policies consist of both direct subsidies to the regions, as well as a mechanism 
reallocating tax revenues between poor and rich municipalities. However, the 
welfare costs of funding subsidies to poorer regions may be considerable. Thus, 
instruments not involving changes in spending have been preferred. Here, we 
consider the relocation of certain functions of the central government to the 
periphery – regionalization – as an instrument for coping with regional structural 
change, as it does not in principle involve direct changes in spending. An 
improvement in regional municipal finances should also reduce the transfers 
received from the central government. 
This study aims at evaluating the effects of regionalization on regional 
development in recent years and in the near future. The study is related to an on-
going evaluation of the financial relations between the central government and 
local authorities. The evaluation is directed by the Ministry of Finance who have 
set guidelines for cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to assess the economic effects of 
regionalization (ATVA 2010). Our study contributes to regionalization CBA in 
both national and regional levels. 
Regionalization has in practice meant the relocation of central government jobs; 
for example, the ministry of the interior relocated some of its jobs from the 
capital to northernmost Finland in 2006. The data we have allows us to cover the 
relocation of jobs quite accurately, and we also have the data of the number of 
employees who actually relocated with the jobs. Moreover, we are able to 
calculate state transfers to local authorities at the level of individual 
municipalities within each region. However, to capture all the implications of 
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relocation to regional economies, we extend the model to take into account the 
average size and age profile of the families of those who relocate. In this way, we 
obtain an estimate on the effects of regionalization on demand for public services 
locally, as well as on the overall effect on local population, labour supply and 
state, municipal and social security funds’ budget balances. 
In economic theory, the assessment of regionalization policies is most 
conveniently conceived in the context of spatial equilibrium theory. The most 
direct effect of an act of regionalization to the receiving region is an increase in 
labour demand which increases the real wage level of the receiving region. The 
effect of an increase in real wages to individual industries is mixed depending on 
whether an industry belongs to the tradable or the non-tradable sector. Tradable 
sector industries have to bear the higher costs without much effect on their output 
prices. Therefore, the effects on tradable sector industries are most likely 
negative in the receiving region. Conversely, tradable sector industries in the 
region of origin might gain if relocation eases some scarcity of resources, say 
dwellings. One of the goals of regionalization is to reduce economic 
“congestion” in the central region and it thus has some support from economic 
theory. For the industries in non-tradable sector such as services, the effects are 
less clear. Directly, regionalization increases labour demand in the public sector, 
which leads to an increased demand of services. In order to assess the costs and 
benefits of regionalization, we need to quantify these effects consistently. We can 
do this most conveniently in an applied general equilibrium (AGE) modelling 
framework that allows us to assess the effects of regionalization not only to the 
industries providing public services, but also the cumulative effects on other 
industries and on public sector finances as well. Most importantly, we can assess 
the impacts on total production or on different welfare measures caused by the 
policy when compared to a sensible baseline scenario. Therefore, our analysis 
with an AGE model directly yields relevant information to the regionalization 
CBA. 
We analyse regionalization at the level of the twenty NUTS3 regions of Finland, 
using VERM, a dynamic, regional, AGE model of the Finnish economy. The 
model is based on the well-known TERM model, but has been extended in 
several aspects. It contains 46 industries and 54 commodities based on 
input/output-data of Statistics Finland including the public services relevant to 
our study. Even more importantly, VERM includes detailed public sector 
accounts and transfers between the sectors. The regions are linked to each other 
economically by trade flows and public fund transfers. 
The study is organised as follows. Section two gives more detailed account of 
regionalization policy and its history in Finland and summary of relevant 
previous studies. Section three describes the model and data in more detail with 
separate subsection devoted to the description of government transfers in the 
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model. Section four summarizes our main simulation results, and section five 
concludes.  
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2. Regionalization 
The use of regionalization as a tool of regional policy in Finland dates back to 
1970s when the Centre Party, which had strong agrarian leanings, wanted to 
contain rural-urban migration and thus improve the situation of peripheral 
regions. In its current form, the regionalization efforts were stated in 
Government’s strategy in 2001. The legislation has been updated few times since 
then and the current goals were set in 2008. However, the issue has not been 
extensively researched thus far. Honkatukia et al. (2007) used a regional AGE 
model to evaluate the previous regionalization efforts along with the 
governmental functions’ productivity program. The study focused on time period 
2001–2006 and consisted of relocation of 3378 government jobs. Although the 
study generated reasonable results, the data on the costs of the regionalization 
process was much sparser than in our present study, consisting merely of 
information about the relocated jobs in the receiving regions. The actual number 
of employees relocating from Helsinki to the other parts of the country was not 
known at the time. The overall results suggested that the regionalization efforts 
have had at least slightly positive effects on supporting the general regional 
policy goal of levelling regional disparities. 
The Ministry of Finance, coordinating the regionalization effort, recently 
published a study of the economic effects of regionalization (ATVA 2011). The 
study was based on surveys and cost-benefit analyses and largely omitted general 
equilibrium effects. Our present study will complement and maybe shed new 
light to the results presented by Ministry of Finance study. 
As the official goal of Finnish central government, some 4000–80001 
government jobs are to be regionalized by 2015. Current regionalization plans 
consist of moving more than 5200 jobs from Helsinki metropolitan area to other 
locations. Almost 4400 jobs were already relocated by the end of 2011. This 
figure amounts 5.5 percent of total central government jobs. The share is 
considerably smaller when compared to the overall employment figures in the 
regions. Therefore, we do not anticipate encountering any large welfare changes 
due to regionalization. However, it was worthwhile to see whether there will be 
national level efficiency gains or losses due to the regionalization. Equally 
important is to see whether these policies can make significant improvements to 
advancing the regional policy goals. This would be valuable information in 
assessing how the projects have lived up to their expectations. We believe that 
our method can capture these effects rather well. 
                                              
1 Measured in person-years. The total Finnish central government person-years amounts to ca. 80 000. 
Thus the regionalization affects 5-10 % of the total jobs. 
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A related study by Pursiainen (2013a and 2013b) assessed the employment 
effects of regionalization policies with an econometric model and reviewed the 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) framework proposed by Ministry of Finance (ATVA 
2010). The econometric estimation (Pursiainen 2013a) did not yield significant 
results and the CBA framework appeared to be rather problematically formulated 
primarily because of several cases of double counting (Pursiainen 2013b). Our 
study complements this effort in several ways. The econometric study did not 
yield definitive results for cumulative effects of regionalization: the parameter 
estimates were either not statistically significant or were not amenable to 
reasonable interpretation. Furthermore, the models yielded only modest 
coefficients of determination. Our approach relies on actual regional data of 
industry I/O-structure and therefore a priori incorporates the most likely paths of 
cumulative effects. Our methodology also allows us to make consistent, 
counterfactual comparisons between with and without regionalization cumulative 
GDP for some relevant time frame, enabling us to assess the core costs and 
benefits of the regionalization effort. Some of the more fuzzy and subjective 
segments of regionalization costs and benefits such as agglomeration, synergy 
and individual career considerations did not enter our analysis. Therefore, 
although our results could serve as the core for the CBA, they are not complete 
as such. 
For our study, we could cover only a part of the relocated jobs, since complete 
data was available only for the largest government agencies. Additionally to the 
number of jobs moved from Helsinki to the other parts of the country, we needed 
to know more precise valuation of the costs involved. These include the wages, 
the costs associated with the premises and the other costs associated with the 
personnel (e.g. re-education costs). Furthermore, we needed to have yearly data 
for reasonable analysis since our model is dynamic. The Ministry of Finance 
supplied the data for a selected sample of the most important relocated agencies. 
The data included the numbers of relocated jobs per agency; the timing of the 
relocation; estimates on the number of people leaving due to relocation from each 
region; and the number of additional jobs created to the receiving regions. 
Additionally, changes in public costs were estimated for each region. Some of 
the relocations actually take the form of combinations of several jobs located in 
various locations in different parts of the country. For some of the agencies we 
could make reasonable assumptions about the initial locations. For example, we 
could assume that the jobs were located across the country according to the 
general division of public costs. For the rest, we could not make such general 
assumption and we had to omit them from our analysis. In total, our study 
includes some 3360 relocations between 2005 and 2015. Of these, only one fifth 
are employees moving from the original location to the new one while the rest 
are recruited as new workers to the relocated agency. Figure 1 shows the 
cumulative amount of employees moving from their original location to the new 
one by region. Etelä-Savo, Kanta-Häme and Varsinais-Suomi are the regions that 
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receive most of the new, relocated labour supply. Etelä-Savo and Kanta-Häme 
are the regions that gain most in relative terms when compared to regional 
population and this will show in our results as well. 
Figure 1. Employees who migrate from original region to new one 
(cumulative person-years) 
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3. Material and Methods 
We use the regional AGE model VERM for our analysis as mentioned earlier. 
The model is based on the widely used TERM model, but has been extended in 
several aspects to be suitable in Finnish public economy analysis. First, we use 
very detailed data on the outlays and incomes of the central government, the 
municipalities and social security funds to realistically study the provision and 
financing of public services and social security transfers and pensions. Secondly, 
we use occupational data to study the demand for labour especially in service 
provision. Thirdly, the model is closed and uses MONASH-type dynamics2. 
We found an AGE model to be very suitable tool for analyzing the issue. With an 
AGE model, we can rather straightforwardly model complicated interactions 
between the relevant agents and isolate the effects from other developments in 
the economy, which cannot be easily done from observed data only. A regional 
model is obviously needed since the relocations take place between regions, and 
since we were particularly interested to analyze how different regions are 
affected by the regionalization policy. The model operates at NUTS3 level, with 
Finland divided in 20 regions. In reality, the jobs are relocated to much smaller 
regional entities, but we found this regional classification sufficient for our 
purposes, since the new locations are mostly the regional centres of these 
regions. However, we expect that the relative effects for the municipalities are 
probably somewhat more pronounced than the ones we present here for the 20 
NUTS3 regions3. Nevertheless, we believe that the NUTS3 classification well 
illustrates the effects these policies have on overall regional development. 
Computation of the transfers 
State support to municipalities amounts to two thirds of the level of total tax 
revenues of the municipalities. Hence, they are indispensable when one wants to 
study the development of financial standing of municipalities. Of this support, 
more than two thirds are special, rule-bound state transfers to the local 
government. The state transfers are directed to different functions of the local 
government: general allowance education and culture, health and social care, and 
redistribution of tax revenues.  The final third of state support consists of several, 
more disparate transfers with less unified payment rules. We assume that this 
final third of the state support is the policy variable that is varied in the 
simulations. The transfer system itself is assumed to continue following the rules 
that were in place at the time of the analysis. In reality, minor changes are 
introduced to the transfer system annually.    
                                              
2 More complete description of model dynamics is in Honkatukia (2009). 
3 The model classification is based on pre-2011 regions. Nowadays there are only 19 NUTS regions in 
Finland after Eastern Uusimaa merged with Uusimaa. 
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As the base year of VERM is currently 2004, that point of time is also our point 
of departure in the description of the transfer system. In 2010, the state transfer 
system was renewed, but the practical consequences of the reform were limited. 
Calculation of the transfers still follows basically the earlier system (see e.g. 
Moisio et al, 2010). However, the changes introduced in recent years have been 
taken into account here. The most remarkable change was related to education, 
where transfers were earlier calculated according to factual number of pupils, but 
from 2010 it was replaced by population in school age. Our model uses this 
renewed base for calculations from the beginning. However, factual numbers are 
imposed to the model between base year and years with available statistics 
(2004–2011). To reiterate, the basic parts of the state transfers to municipalities 
are: 
• General allowance 
• Health and social care transfer 
• Education and culture transfer 
• Redistribution of municipal tax income 
 
The general allowance is calculated on the basis of population size, lagged 
changes in price level. In addition, several indicators measuring how peripherally 
the municipality is located affect the allowance. However, these measures hardly 
change over the course of time. It is rather different political decisions on the size 
of different parameters and weights that have changed more during 2004–2011. 
Health and social care transfers are calculated by using age-specific cost 
coefficients for the services. The inhabitants are classified into five age groups: 
• 0–6 years 
• 7–64 years 
• 65–74 years 
• 75–84 years and 
• 85 years or more. 
 
Furthermore, we divide the 7–64-year-olds into two categories (7–15 and 16–64) 
in order to readily have separate measures for school and working age 
populations.  
Redistribution of the municipal tax income is a ‘Robin Hood’ system where a 
municipality receives a redistribution transfer if its tax income per capita is less 
than 91.86 per cent of the national average tax income per capita (redistribution 
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cut-off level). The redistribution transfer amounts to the difference between the 
cut-off level and the tax income per capita. If the tax revenues of a municipality 
surpass the national average, 37 per cent of the tax income surpassing the average 
per-capita level is claimed by the state to finance the transfers to poorer 
municipalities. Due to this asymmetry in the system, we decided to create a 
municipal dimension to the model, just for the calculation of the redistribution 
transfer. Factual statistics of each municipality is being used for the period of 
2004–2011 (payments in 2011 are based on 2009 figures) while from then on 
each municipality is assumed to follow the development of its corresponding 
region. 
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4. Results  
In this chapter we summarize our results based on VERM simulations. The 
results are comparisons of business as usual case where no regionalization occurs 
to the case where regionalization happens as planned. The base year of the model 
is 2004 and the baseline simulation solves with known historical data up to 
present after which it follows economic prediction derived from various sources. 
For our analysis, we needed to modify standard VERM baseline by removing the 
regionalization measures already completed. That way we could assess the 
effects of regionalization measures starting from the year 2005. Based on the data 
received from Ministry of Finance, we built counterfactual that included changes 
in regional labour supply, public expenditures and employment in public services 
industry due to regionalization. 
National level 
At the national level, the regionalization policy generates GDP losses. Figure 2 
shows the deviation of national level GDP and its components from baseline 
during the simulation period. We can see that GDP decreases because of 
regionalization: in 2018 the GDP is 0.05 % less in real terms than in the baseline. 
The magnitude of the overall effect is thus modest, as anticipated. We can see an 
initial increase in public consumption during the transition period. Increased 
public consumption displaces some of the private consumption that declines as a 
result. After the transition period, public consumption decreases as well but 
remains at a higher level than in the baseline. A large part of the effects during 
the transition period can be explained by double effort – for some time a 
government occupation is filled in both original and receiving locations – and by 
new investments needed for new or renovated premises in the receiving regions. 
However, aggregate investments decrease despite increased investments by 
public sector (which we can see later in figure 3). Therefore, as with 
consumption, we see that increased public investments are displacing private 
investments disproportionately. Investments seem to stay at somewhat lower 
level than in the baseline. Exports decrease significantly as compared to 
relatively stable imports. This results from the non-tradable sector gaining at the 
expense of the tradable sector. The persistently higher level of public 
consumption is problematic as it undermines one of the main rationales for 
regionalization policy –contributing to regional policy goals without increasing 
spending. As the government bodies that are directly affected by regionalization 
reduce or maintain their aggregate level of spending even after transition, the 
overall increase in public spending has to come from other sources, which we 
next examine with more detail. 
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Figure 2.  Real GDP development at the national level: total and 
expenditure side contributions (cumulative percentage deviation 
from baseline in 2005–2018. 
 
 
In figures 3 and 4 we see how regionalization affects central government 
expenditure and revenue categories. Four expenditure categories are significantly 
affected by the policy: government purchases, net interest payments, net transfers 
to municipalities and other government expenditure. Government purchases 
increase most and the highest increase coincides with the transition period. The 
revenues increase as well but by less than expenditures, and thus we see an 
increase in public sector deficits (figure 5). The increase in the net interest 
payments by the government is a direct result of increased deficits. 
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Figure 3.  Central government expenditures after regionalization (deviation 
from baseline, millions of euros) 
 
Figure 4.  Central government revenues after regionalization (deviation 
from baseline, millions of euros) 
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Figure 5. Public sector deficits by sector (deviation from baseline, millions 
of euros) 
 
 
We expected that the net transfers to municipalities would decrease due to the 
policy as the receiving regions experience increase in their incomes. According 
to our results, the transfers in the VOS system4 from central government to 
municipalities do decrease (figure 6). However, the other transfers from central 
government to municipalities increase by an amount greater than the decrease in 
net VOS payments. Figure 7 shows what happens to separate VOS payment 
categories. Regional equalization payments decrease most but with the expense 
of increasing other central government transfers to municipalities. 
  
                                              
4 VOS is a government system that reallocates funds from well-off municipalities to the poor ones. It 
makes up about two thirds of all the transfers from central government to municipalities. 
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Figure 6. Transfers from central government to municipalities after 
regionalization (deviation from baseline, millions of euros) 
 
Figure 7. VOS transfer development (deviation from baseline, millions of 
euros) 
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Figure 8 collects the changes in some macro variables that shed more light to the 
GDP results. Generally, regionalization seems to have negative effects on 
employment which decreases by 0.03 percents compared to the baseline. This 
decrease results from negative effects on overall economic activity. Aggregate 
capital stock decreases together with employment and investments. Real wages 
and consumer prices both increase at the national level. We will return to the 
causes of real wage and consumer price index increases when we examine the 
regional differences in changes. 
Figure 8.  Changes in some macro variables (cumulative percentage 
deviation from baseline, 2005–2018) 
 
Regional level 
At the regional level we see that real wages increase most in the regions that lose 
jobs and decrease most on regions that gain most of the relocated jobs (figure 9). 
This seems counterintuitive as spatial equilibrium theory would predict that the 
real wages would decrease when labour demand diminishes. However, the 
empirical industrial structure in our model causes the effect of price changes to 
dominate. As nominal wages have trajectories independent of region, we are left 
with the changes in consumer price index to explain the real wage changes. As 
figure 10 shows, the consumer price index decreases most in Uusimaa, the 
central region and increases most in Kanta-Häme and Etelä-Savo. By examining 
consumer price index by commodity, we see that commodity prices that respond 
most to the regionalization are the public services – that is directly affected by 
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regionalization – and the letting of own property which is an indirect effect of 
induced migration. Therefore, the real wages in Uusimaa increase due to 
decreased residential costs. The effect is opposite in the receiving regions. 
Figure 9. Real wage changes by region (cumulative percentage deviation 
from baseline, 2005–2018) 
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Figure 10. Consumer price index changes by region (cumulative percentage 
deviation from baseline, 2005–2018) 
 
 
In figure 11 we see the GDP and employment effects for all the twenty regions in 
2015 and 2025. The two regions that gain most are Kanta-Häme and Etelä-Savo 
that are the regions with highest amount of extra labour supply migrated with 
regionalized jobs. Conversely the central region of Uusimaa will lose in both 
GDP and employment. The changes in consumption have a similar regional 
pattern with smaller deviations from baseline (figure 12). The aggregate national 
level results do not imply overall welfare improvements, rather the opposite. 
However, the goal of levelling regional disparities does stand out from the 
regional results – peripheral regions gain at the expense of the capital region. 
There are two regions that especially stand out: Etelä-Savo and Kanta-Häme. 
Interestingly, some regions, such as Kainuu, with perhaps rather more pressing 
regional development problems, gain next to nothing from regionalization. 
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Figure 11. Regional GDP and employment effects (percentage deviation 
from baseline, 2015 and 2025) 
 
Figure 12. Regional consumption effects (percentage deviation from 
baseline, 2015 and 2025) 
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The central government deficit increases because of regionalization. VERM 
allows us to evaluate how central government revenues and expenditures are 
distributed across the regions, as shown in Figure 13. The deficit increases in 
receiving regions and decreases in Uusimaa that loses public jobs. 
Figure 13. Central government deficits by region after regionalization 
(deviation from baseline, millions of euros, 2005–2018) 
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5. Conclusion 
In this study we have analyzed the economic effects of Finnish central 
government’s regionalization program. We found it questionable whether the 
policy achieves the goals set to it. From a strict CBA point of view, our results 
are discouraging: there is a clear, if modest, fall in national product after 
regionalization. The policy seems to increase public spending and causes public 
finances to deteriorate compared to the business-as-usual case. Therefore, we do 
not find support for the claim that regionalization would be a spending neutral 
regional policy tool. The transfers from central government to municipalities 
increase too, which runs counter to the idea of regionalization policy decreasing 
municipalities’ dependency on central government funding. However, we did 
find evidence on decreased regional disparities due to regionalization – some 
peripheral regions gain at the expense of the capital region. Yet it is difficult to 
judge on the basis of our results whether this effect contributes to overall regional 
development goals and whether the regions that most need extra boost can get it 
through the current regionalization program.  
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